Nonmonotonic reasoning has been explored as a form of abductive reasoning where default assumptions are treated as abductive hypotheses. While the semantics and proof theories under this approach have been studied extensively, the question of how disjunctive programs may be used to reason abductively has rarely been investigated. At the center of the question is how to embed disjunctive reasoning into that of negation-as-failure. A more concrete question is about whether the elegant abductive proof procedure by Eshghi and Kowalski can be extended to answer queries for disjunctive programs, and if yes, what is the semantics that such an extended procedure computes. In this paper we answer these questions by formulating a semantics, the regular extension semantics, for disjunctive programs, and by presenting a sound and complete extension of the Eshghi-Kowalski procedure, called disjunctive EK procedure, for query answering with respect to ground disjunctive programs under this semantics.
/

Introduction
Logic programming with negation has been considered by many as providing a suitable framework for abductive reasoning. In this approach, default negations in the form of not are treated as abducibles, and an explanation of an observation is a set of abducibles that, along with the given program, derives the observation while satisfying some desired integrity constraints. In some of the more general abductive systems, positive atoms are also allowed to be abducibles.
The insight into the connection between abduction and default negation was rst observed by Eshghi and Kowalski who showed an abductive interpretation of negation-as- failure 15] . A number of authors subsequently investigated abductive semantics and proof procedures for normal programs. Kakas et al. presented a comprehensive exploration of abductive logic programming 20, 21] . A fundamental insight is that abductive reasoning embodies an argumentation approach to logic programming semantics. Dung 12] , as well as Bondarenko et al. 7] , subsequently showed that nonmonotonic reasoning in general is a form of argumentation using default assumptions.
Independently, the regular model semantics was discovered under a three-valued logic, and it was shown that for normal programs this semantics coincides with a number of independently proposed semantics 38] . This provides an abductive argumentation interpretation and an alternating xpoint characterization for the regular model semantics 3, 11] . More important, the Eshghi-Kowalski (EK) procedure, enhanced by positive loop checking, is known to be sound and complete (for nite ground programs) for these equivalent semantics (cf. 18]). Recently, disjunction, sometimes called epistemic disjunction to distinguish it from classic disjunction 16], has been considered an important addition to logic programming based knowledge representation systems. Theoretically, in terms of de nability of relations, the class of disjunctive programs is strictly more expressive than that of normal programs. Practically, disjunction provides a language construct for specifying a number of problem solutions naturally 2, 16, 17, 24] .
As pointed out by a number of authors (e.g., 8]), the semantic and prooftheoretic issues for disjunctive programs have proved to be far more complex and di cult than for normal programs. The primary reason seems to lie in the general di culty of combining di erent reasoning mechanisms, in the current case in combining disjunction and negation-as-failure. It is generally much more di cult to understand the behavior of the interaction of di erent language constructs. The elegant general frameworks like the ones proposed in 7, 23] provide little clue as how to formulate and build a speci c combined system. For example, the acceptability operator as given in 23] does not tell us which xpoints constitute a reasonable semantics and which do not (though many existing semantics can be described by some xpoints of that operator), what underlying logic may be used to de ne an abductive semantics for disjunctive programs, and what procedure may be used to compute it. These speci c questions have to be investigated and answered before abductive reasoning with disjunctive programs can be understood.
The question of interpreting disjunctive programs within abductive frameworks has been pursued by Dung 9] , who shows that for the class of acyclic (i.e. head-cycle free and strati ed negation) disjunctive programs, the EK procedure can be used to answer queries under the stable model semantics. Dung uses the technique of shifting to show that this class of disjunctive programs reduce to normal programs. However, it is known that the technique of shifting does not in general preserve even the stable model semantics.
The handling of disjunction is brie y mentioned in Kakas et al.'s article on abductive logic programming 21] with a reference to an unpublished manuscript by Dung 10] , where an embedding of linear resolution into the EK procedure is speci ed. Though the procedure seems to provide an interesting form of abductive reasoning with disjunction, the question about what semantics the procedure computes is left unanswered.
More recently , 40] shows that the stable model semantics for disjunctive programs can be understood as selecting monotonic inferences using a language with priority. This creates a new semantics for disjunctive programs, which extends the stable model semantics for disjunctive programs in the same way as the regular model semantics extends the stable model semantics for normal programs. The semantics is called the regular extension semantics (it was called earlier the partial stable semantics in 40] which may be confused with many other uses of \partial stable" in the literature). Though for normal programs the regular extension semantics coincides with the regular model semantics as de ned in 37], there are signi cant di erences between them for disjunctive programs. It is known that a regular model always exists for any disjunctive program and the semantics based on it is more expressive than that based on stable model 13, 14] . But some authors argue that the regular model semantics does not seem to be intuitive for some disjunctive programs. The regular extension semantics is proposed in a response to this criticism. Indeed, the proof-theoretic extension of the EK procedure for disjunctive programs supports the claim that the regular extension semantics is more natural for disjunctive programs.
The regular extension semantics was strongly motivated by its natural form of abductive reasoning and the observation that some forms of extended EK procedure could be used as a top-down proof procedure to answer queries under this semantics. But the exact form of such a procedure was not totally clear to the authors at the time. The primary goal of this paper is to show that a variant of Dung's procedure, called the disjunctive EK procedure, is an abductive procedure for the regular extension semantics. It is sound and complete for nite, ground disjunctive programs. Since logic programming has been identi ed with a goal-oriented programming paradigm, the existence of an elegant top-down proof procedure is undoubtedly a signi cant feature for any semantics.
The semantics of disjunctive programs has been studied by a number of authors. The static semantics 30] is not designed to be capable of abductive reasoning. Al-most all its implementations rely on a bottom-up generation of minimal models.
It is unclear what a top-down proof procedure for the semantics would be. The stable model semantics as well as the answer set semantics relies on global information in its semantic de nition. As a result, any backward chaining proof procedure has to search much irrelevant search space to determine whether a stable model exists (cf. 6]). However, we will show that regular extension is a weaker notion of stable model, in that every stable model corresponds to a regular extension but the reverse does not hold in general. Therefore, the proof procedure given in this paper is also applicable to any program whose stable models coincide with its regular extensions. For normal programs, a criterion to guarantee such coincidence is well-known; namely, no odd negative dependency loops are present in a program 37]. This criterion can be extended for disjunctive programs. In this sense, the procedure described in this paper is also an abductive proof procedure for the stable model semantics of disjunctive programs.
Furthermore, the disjunctive EK procedure presents a new method of abductive reasoning with minimal models for positive disjunctive programs; namely, a query is answered w.r.t. whether it is true in one minimal model. The abducibles obtained in the course of proving such a query by the disjunctive EK procedure are the atoms that are false in the corresponding minimal model. This form of abductive reasoning di ers from the more standard reasoning mode of showing that a query is true in all minimal models (e.g., MILO-resolution by Przymusinski 29] ). As pointed out by Aravindan 1] , there are signi cant di erences between the proof methods for nding consequences and those for abduction, and the existing proof procedures based on consequence nding, such as MILO-resolution, have inherent di culties if applied to abductive reasoning. In the same paper, Aravindan proposes an abductive procedure for positive disjunctive programs based on the restart model elimination calculus of 4, 5] . Our work shows that abductive reasoning with positive disjunctive programs is just a special case of abductive reasoning with disjunctive programs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we re-formulate the regular extension semantics, independently of the priority framework in which it was rst formalized in an indirect, somewhat complex way. In Section 3 we show that the regular extension semantics has a natural abductive argumentation interpretation for disjunctive programs. This feature has the important implication of using the regular extension semantics as a basis for a knowledge representation language. Then in Section 4 we present the disjunctive EK procedure, and show it computes the regular extension semantics. Our version of disjunctive EK procedure is modied from that of Dung's. This modi cation is nontrivial. In fact, we will see that Dung's original version employs a slightly di erent idea on the defeat of an argument, which allows default negations to be justi ed more easily. So for the regular extension semantics, it is in fact unsound. This insight reveals the technical sub-tleties and di erent possibilities in combining disjunction with negation-as-failure. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss further related work and conclude the paper with remarks.
This paper is revised and extended from a preliminary version that appeared as 41]. we can derive a if we can prove not b (presumably by negation-as-failure). The requirement that n 2 is to ensure that inconsistency will not be a result from applying this inference rule. We will use`d to denote the standard rst order derivation relation augmented by RAC. Note that`d is a monotonic relation.
Regular Extension
Another way to understand RAC is that`d produces a form of abductive reasoning for positive disjunctive programs based on minimal models: A set of ordinary atoms M is a minimal model of a positive disjunctive program P i for any ordinary atom , 2 M , P M not`d (this claim is proved in Section 2.3 when we relate regular extensions with stable models). RAC essentially reduces classic disjunction to epistemic disjunction for abductive reasoning.
In the sequel, our technical exploration will be based on ground programs.
Regular extension semantics
The regular extension semantics, initially formulated in the context of \priority logic " 40] , is based on the notion of alternating xpoint, rst used by Van Gelder 36] , and later by a number of authors (cf. 3, 28, 36, 38] ) to de ne and study the semantics of normal programs and default theories. The interest in this technique is that the regular model semantics for normal programs, and all the semantics equivalent to it, can be expressed by maximal normal alternating xpoints. First let us de ne a function F P over sets S of assumptions as:
F P (S) = fnot : is an ordinary atom such that P S 6`d g:
It is easy to check that this function has the following property, called antimonotonicity: S 1 S 2 ) F P (S 2 ) F P (S 1 ). This holds because the derivation relation`d is monotonic; the more we have, the less we do not derive. Consequently, the composite function that applies F P twice, denoted F 2 P , is monotonic. That is,
Hence according to xpoint theory, commonly referred to as the Tarski-Knaster xpoint theorem, F 2 P possesses a least xpoint, a maximum xpoint, and possibly some others over the domain of a complete lattice.
A xpoint of the function F 2 P is called an alternating xpoint of F P (or simply, P). An alternating xpoint S is said to be normal if S F P (S). For normal programs, the least alternating xpoint (which is necessarily normal) corresponds to the wellfounded model 3, 36] , and the maximal normal alternating xpoints correspond to regular models/preferential extensions 11, 37]. Here we use maximal normal alternating xpoints to de ne a credulous semantics for disjunctive programs.
De nition 2.1. (Regular extension)
A regular extension of a disjunctive program P is a maximal normal alternating xpoint of P. It is easy to show that S = fnot dg is a maximal normal alternating xpoint. First, F P (S) = fnot d; not a; not bg. Then, F 2 P (S) = fnot dg. Further, S F P (S).
Thus, S is a normal alternating xpoint. In addition, it is easy to see that S is the only normal alternating xpoint.
For example, S 0 = fnot d; not ag is not an alternating xpoint, since F P (S 0 ) = fnot d; not a; not bg and F 2 P (S 0 ) = fnot dg. Further, though S 00 = fnot d; not a; not bg is an alternating xpoint (in fact, the maximum alternating xpoint), it is not normal. Thus, S is trivially maximal.
By the equivalence results given in 38], we know that for normal programs, the regular extension semantics reduces to the regular model semantics. For the non-normal case, there are signi cant di erences between the two. This program has three regular models, one of which, for example, says that work is true, and sleep and tired are unde ned. Regular models are based on the principles of justi cation and minimal unde nedness in the context of three-valued logic 37]. The intuitions of the reasoning processes under these principles are therefore intimately related to those of three-valued logic and inferences. For normal programs, these intuitions provide a natural interpretation of negation-as-failure. However, in the presence of disjunction these intuitions seem unable to completely capture the notion of negation-as-failure. For example, in three-valued logic, the program above, along with sleep and tired being unde ned, implies that work is true. This way of justifying work seems unintuitive under the notion of negation-as-failure.
This program has only one regular extension, which is the empty set. This can be veri ed as follows: F P (;) = fnot work; not sleep; not tiredg F P (fnot work; not sleep; not tiredg) = ; and thus ; is an alternating xpoint of P, and in fact the only one that is normal.
The use of the inference rule RAC may be viewed as semantically shifting disjunctive clauses in a program P. Recall that the idea of shifting a clause A B; not C (cf. 9, 17]) is to syntactically transform such a clause to a set of normal clauses where, for each atom in A there is a normal clause with as the head and any other atom in A is removed to the body as not . This technique is too strong to capture even the minimal model semantics of positive disjunctive programs (cf. 17, 33] ). The program has a head-cycle between a and b. In terms of strati cation, a should be one level higher than b (by the second clause) and b should be one level higher than a (by the third clause); but a and b also appear in the same head of a clause; hence the term head-cycle.
The program has two stable models (which are just minimal models), fcg and fa; bg. However, the shifted normal program P shift below has no stable model. The idea of representing epistemic disjunction by classic disjunction combined with shifting does not work either. In this case the program to be considered is P 0 = P P shift where _ denotes classical disjunction. However, fnot cg is not a xpoint of the operator: F P 0 (S) = fnot : is an ordinary atom such that P 0 S 6 g: That is, the original stable model fa; bg is lost. 1 Head-cycles are not the only problem for shifting. There are head-cycle free programs for which shifting does not provide a complete solution. This example shows that even in the case where shifting does preserve regular extensions, a complete proof procedure for normal programs is not guaranteed to be complete for disjunctive programs. We show that a stable model corresponds to a xpoint of F P , which is trivially a maximal normal alternating xpoint of F P . This relation is known for normal programs. RAC plays an essential role in extending the same relation to disjunctive programs. Theorem 2.1. Let P be a disjunctive program and M be a set of ordinary atoms.
Relation with stable model semantics
M is a stable model of It is known that for positive disjunctive programs stable models coincide with minimal models. Then, by the above theorem, a minimal model is a regular extension. For the reverse, we need to show that for any regular extension M not , M is a minimal model. Assume that M is not a minimal model of P. Then either M is not a model, or it is a model but not a minimal one. It is easy to show that the former leads to the conclusion that M not is not normal, and the latter leads to the conclusion that M not is not maximal (the details are left to the reader); in neither case M not can be a regular extension. 2 The implication of this corollary is that any abductive proof procedure for the regular extension semantics is automatically an abductive proof procedure for positive disjunctive programs based on the minimal model semantics. This is the case for the disjunctive EK procedure to be given later in this paper.
Regular Extensions Constitute an Abductive Semantics
In the simplest form abduction is the problem: from A and A B, infer B as a possible explanation of A. We argue that the regular extension semantics constitutes an abductive semantics for disjunctive programs.
De nition 3.1. Let P be a disjunctive program and S be a set of assumptions.
Further de ne a set of constraints IC as follows: IC = f? ( 1 _ ::: _ n ); not 1 ; :::; not n : n 1g:
Then S is said to be ?-consistent if P S IC 6`d ?.
IC expresses that no disjunction 1 _:::_ n and conjunction not 1^: ::^not n should hold simultaneously under any semantics. Note that we use a special symbol ? to di erentiate between this type of \inconsistency" and the classic notion of inconsistency.
The following de nition is paraphrased from that of Dung 11] except that here we de ne it for disjunctive programs, and the underlying derivation relation is augmented by RAC.
De nition 3.2. Let P be a disjunctive program. An assumption not is said to be acceptable w.r.t. an assumption set S if for any assumption set S 0 such that P S 0`d , we have P S`d , for some not 2 S 0 . A preferred extension E is a maximal assumption set that is ?-consistent such that for every not 2 E, not is acceptable w.r.t. E.
We show that there is one-to-one correspondence between regular extensions and preferred extensions. This gives an abductive argumentation interpretation of regular extensions for disjunctive programs. The fact that a semantics can be de ned in di erent frameworks is some kind of indication of its naturalness. Equally important is the fact that this correspondence provides us a more intuitive yet simpler means to prove the soundness and completeness of the disjunctive EK procedure.
We rst prove two lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. Any regular extension of a disjunctive program P is ?-consistent. Proof. Suppose a regular extension E is not ?-consistent. That is P E`d ( 1 _ ::: _ n ); not 1 ; :::; not n ; for some n 1: This implies that fnot 1 ; :::; not n g E. Applying RAC, we get P E`d i for each 1 i n. By the de nition of F P , we get not i 6 2 F P (E), for each 1 i n. Thus E does not satisfy the condition of being normal, and therefore it cannot be a regular extension. Contradiction. 2 The following lemma is extended from a similar result for normal programs 39]. Lemma 3.2. Let P be a disjunctive program and S be an assumption set. Then, F 2 P (S) = D P (S), where D P (S) = fnot : not is acceptable w.r.t. Sg. Proof. (i) F 2 P (S) D P (S). Let not 2 F 2 P (S). We show that not is acceptable w.r.t. S. That is, for any assumption set W such that P W`d , we have P S`d , for some not 2 W. 13 First we note that, by the de nition of F P , that not 2 F 2 P (S) implies P F P (S) 6`d . Next, we see that W 6 = ;, as otherwise P`d which contradicts P F P (S) 6`d . Then, by the de nition of F P , we get W ?F P (S) fnot : P S`d g. We claim that W ? F P (S) 6 = ;, as otherwise W F P (S), and from P W`d we get P F P (S)`d , resulting in a contradiction. Therefore, there exists at least one not 2 W such that P S`d . By de nition we know not is acceptable w.r.t. S, i.e. not 2 D P (S).
(ii) D P (S) F 2 P (S). Let not 2 D P (S). This implies that for any assumption set W such that P W`d , we have P S`d , for some not 2 W. If for any assumption set W, P W 6`d , then clearly P F P (S) 6`d , and thus not 2 F 2 P (S). Now let W be an assumption set such that P W`d and consider each W 0 W such that W 0 is a minimal set satisfying P W 0`d . Since not 2 D P (S), we have P S`d , for some not 2 W 0 . Hence not 6 2 F P (S). It follows that P F P (S) 6`d . Then by de nition, we get not 2 F 2 P (S). 2 Theorem 3.1. For any disjunctive program P, a preferred extension of P is a regular extension of P, and vice versa. Proof. Assume S is a preferred extension and show it is a regular extension. It is easy to show (we omit the details here) that S = D P (S), and thus by Lemma 3.2, S is a xpoint of F 2 P . It is also a routine exercise to show that S is normal. We then can show, from the maximality of S as a preferred extension, that S is a maximal normal xpoint of F 2 P , and thus a regular extension. Assume S is a regular extension and show it is a preferred extension. It follows from Lemma 3.2 that S is a xpoint of F 2 P . Lemma 3.1 shows that S is ?-consistent. Then the maximality of S as a normal alternative xpoint of F P can be used to show the maximality of S as a preferred extension. 2 There are potential applications of abductive reasoning with disjunctive programs. For example, in AI planning and scheduling, in general we are interested in whether there is a plan that achieves the goal, and whether there is a schedule that satis es the speci ed constraints. Such a solution corresponds to an explanation (abducibles in a plan, for example) to an observation (the goal to be achieved). 2 Let us use an simple example to explain the notion of abductive solution in this context. accepted(x; y) pay cash(x; y) accepted(x; y) pay by credit(x; y) This program intuitively says that bob shaves those who do not shave themselves; If x shaves y then y pays x by cash or by credit; either way is accepted.
Assume there is another person, called greg. Then clearly, we should conclude bob shaves greg, and greg pays bob by cash or by credit, either way is accepted. However, the program has no stable models in this case. But it has two regular extensions, both containing not shave(greg; greg).
Suppose we observe pay cash(greg; bob). Then the following set of abducibles (in the premise), along with the program, explains this observation: P fnot shave(greg; greg); not pay by credit(greg; bob)g`d pay cash(greg; bob):
An interesting aspect of abductive reasoning is related to prediction. As a speci c form of prediction, it is about completing, or enriching, the initially speci ed, incomplete information. Example 3.2. Consider the popular, broken-hand example originally discussed in the context of default reasoning 27]: We know either the left hand is broken or the right hand is broken, and in general, a hand is usable if not broken. The given information is incomplete as we don't know which hand is broken and which is not (perhaps both could have been broken).
For the purpose of demonstrating the point of augmenting partial information, we further assume that the left hand being usable leads to the use of it that results in moving a block; and the use of the right hand leads to moving the table.
lh broken _ rh broken lh usable not lh broken rh usable not rh broken move block lh usable move table rh usable Now suppose we observe that the block is moved from its original location (and suppose we cannot see any operations). Under the closed world assumption for operations (namely, no other operations other than the ones performed by the program may be performed), we can predict that it is the right hand that is broken.
Disjunctive EK Procedure
The disjunctive EK procedure combines the EK procedure with a sound and complete linear resolution procedure, augmented by the inference rule RAC. The linear resolution procedure is adopted from 24] and reformulated here to facilitate the presentation of the disjunctive EK procedure.
A goal is generally written as l 1 ; :::; l k ; not k+1 ; :::; not m where each l i is either an (ordinary) atom or a negated atom, and each not i is an abducible.
An empty clause (or goal) is denoted by 2.
It is convenient to assume that subgoal selection is from the left to right, and that a goal is expressed as l; N where l is the current subgoal to be resolved, and N the collection of the remaining subgoals.
Because of the restriction to ground programs, we can omit factoring, which is used in linear resolution to preserve completeness. We only need to assume that repeated literals in a goal or in the head of a clause are removed whenever necessary.
Resolution is an inference rule for rst order clausal theories. For disjunctive programs, we only need to use it in three speci c ways: goal resolution, ancestor resolution, and body literal resolution. For the presentation purposes, we introduce each one at a time.
Goal resolution is carried out between the current goal and a program clause. It is completely goal oriented | it focuses only on the current goal and uses program clauses to resolve it. A negated atom in a goal may be proved by negation-as-failure for abductive reasoning. This would implement the inference rule RAC. Goal resolution and ancestor resolution together still fail to yield a complete proof procedure. It is clear that we could resolve 6 with 3 to get a clause which resolves with 4 to generate an empty goal. The resolution step between 6 and 3 will be called body literal resolution. The question here is whether body literal resolution is absolutely needed. For the current example the answer is no, because, as we will see later, not b can be proved by negation-as-failure. Indeed, for this example, it is possible to prove not b in one proof so that P fnot bg`d c, and not a in another proof.
However, there are examples where resolving with a body literal is necessary. We are now ready to give a complete description of the disjunctive EK procedure. An abductive refutation is an abductive derivation from (G; H 1 ) to (2; H n ).
Consistency Derivation
A consistency derivation from (F 1 ; H 1 ) to (F n ; H n ) is a sequence ( Here are some technical remarks on the procedure. 3 Since each goal is resolved by all applicableclauses and previous goals, a consistencyderivation is a derivation tree. We use the term a derivation branch to mean a sequence of resolution steps in a branch of such a tree. 4 A resolvent goal is new in a consistency derivation if it has never appeared in the goal set of the derivation.
Abductive derivations are relatively straightforward: nd one way of proving a goal, including showing a subgoal of the form : by negation-as-failure, which corresponds to the semantic commitment of RAC. AD1 is essentially linear resolution. The condition not 2 H i in AD2 indicates that not is already accepted and may be used directly. AD3 relies on a consistency derivation to prove not . Note that if l is a negated atom : and not 6 2 H i , both AD1 and AD3 can be applied.
Completeness requires that no alternatives are missed.
Consistency derivations are more involved. Recall in De nition 2, an assumption not ' is said to be acceptable w.r.t. an assumption set S if for any assumption set S 0 such that P S 0`d ', we have P S`d , for some not 2 S 0 . This can be described more intuitively as follows:
for not ' to be acceptable w.r.t. S, every attack S 0 to not ' must be counterattacked by S. This notion of counter-attack embodies a notion of defeat that requires a derivation of . Thus, the goal of a consistency derivation is to show that for each potential derivation leading to ', either the derivation is not possible (for example, due to a positive loop or no de nition clause), or at least one assumption not on which the derivation relies is defeated.
The purpose of CO1 and CO2 is to expand the current goal set to include all possible derivations of ' (w.r.t. the selected literal). Missing any of these may result in wrongly concluding not ' (i.e. some attacks to it may have been missed and therefore have not been shown to be defeated). Linear resolution is used in CO1 and CO2 to resolve upon an ordinary or a negated atom. Since linear resolution is sound and complete for`, it is guaranteed that the generated goals are faithful tò . That is, the generated goals from a selected literal l represent all the possibilities of deriving ' from expanding l under the derivation relation`.
CO1 deals with the case where l is an ordinary atom. If l does not appear in the head of any clause and ancestor resolution is not applicable on l, G, the set of resolvent goals, must be empty. The union operation in obtaining F i+1 in this case removes the selected goal, because this possible way of deriving ' cannot succeed under`, and thus it cannot succeed under`d .
CO2 deals with the case where l is a negated atom. Note that the union operation in obtaining F i+1 is G F i . That is, the goal being resolved is retained in F i+1 . This is because, when`is extended to`d , proving a negated atom : by establishing not may present additional possibilities of deriving '. Soundness requires that none of these be missed.
CO3 and CO4 deal with abducibles and negated atoms. Negated atoms are treated as abducibles. This extends`to`d for consistency derivations. The handling of abducibles (and negated atoms as well) is the same as that for normal programs. In CO3 when not 2 H i , we know that consistently deriving is not possible, and we continue with N if it is not empty; if N is empty, the proof should be aborted because there is at least one attack that cannot be defeated. In CO4, the defeat is established by an abductive refutation, or we continue with the rest of the subgoals if there are any.
In any consistency derivation, a potential derivation need not be considered if it involves a positive loop, because it cannot form an attack to the abducible under consideration. This is given in CO5. For example, with the program fa not b; b bg, the abductive derivation for the goal a invokes a consistency derivation which begins with the goal set f bg. The only goal in it is resolved to itself which, by CO5, should be removed. This results in an empty set, hence the goal a is proved.
Note that in a consistency derivation the empty goal 2 is in the goal set if the selected goal is resolved to 2. In this case, the consistency derivation cannot succeed (i.e., it cannot be reduced to an empty set of goals) since there is no provision in our procedure to remove an empty goal. The same e ect is achieved in 11, 15] for normal programs by requiring that 2 not be a resolvent goal.
We now show some examples. In drawing these proofs, we use \O for empty set For any program whose stable models coincide with regular extensions, DEKP can be used to answer queries for the stable model semantics.
The consistency derivation reduces to because the only goal cannot be resolved by any clause. Using our procedure, we get, by an application of CO2, the goal set {<--c, -d; <--p, -d}. For the rst goal there is no abductive refutation for either <-c or <-d, thus the goal set cannot be reduced to , and therefore the original goal <-a does not have a refutation.
The behavior of Dung's proof procedure for this example is like that of the Osemantics 26], where the main idea is that to justify a default negation not , one doesn't have to show that every way of deriving is defeated, instead one only needs to show that it is not possible to derive consistently. This appears to be the only di erence between DEKP given in this paper and Dung's original version.
We now prove the soundness and completeness of DEKP for propositional disjunctive programs. Theorem 5.1. Let P be a ( nite ground) disjunctive program and be a literal.
(Soundness) For any abductive refutation ( ; ); :::; (2; H), there is a regular extension E such that H E and P H`d .
(Completeness) For any nite regular extension E such that P E`d , there is an abductive refutation ( ; ); :::; (2;H), such that H E and P H`d . 2
Note that the soundness and completeness as given in this theorem imply the following more intuitive statement: Whenever a goal is proved using DEKP, it is guaranteed that is true in one regular extension, and for any that is true in one regular extension, it is guaranteed that EDKP generates a demonstrating proof. The set of hypotheses H generated in such a proof of is su cient for this demonstration. Proof. First, let us x our terminology: since each abductive derivation may contain one or more consistency derivations, and vice versa, we will refer to those subproofs as blocks.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the subgoals in a goal or any resolvent goal are always re-arranged so that ordinary atoms appear before negated atoms which appear before abducibles. Thus by the left-most selection rule the ordinary atoms in a goal and its derived goals are always resolved before negated atoms which are resolved before abducibles. We will refer to this assumption as the goal form assumption.
(Soundness) Due to Theorem 3.1, we only need prove: for any abductive refutation ( ; ); :::; (2;H), we have
(2) H is ?-consistent; and (3) every not ' 2 H is acceptable w.r.t. H.
Then a regular extension E such that H E exists because it is a maximal set satisfying these properties. PROOF of (1). To show P H`d , we only need to focus on the outermost abductive block, where the initial goal is resolved to a goal possibly containing negated atoms and/or abducibles. Let H 0 be the set of all these negated atoms and abducibles. Clearly, H 0 H, and in the given abductive refutation each abducible in H 0 is proved by a consistency derivation. It is then clear that P H`d simply because linear resolution is sound for`, and`d is obtained by treating negated atoms as abducibles in AD2.
PROOF of (2). We prove this by contradiction. Assume H is not ?-consistent.
We show that the assumed abductive refutation cannot possibly be generated by DEKP. Since each abducible in H is introduced one at a time into H during the given abductive refutation, there is some abducible, say not 2 H, which is the last one in H m that is introduced in the abductive refutation. That is, a goal of the form ( not ; :::; H 0 ) appears in some abductive block where every abducible in H m is already in H 0 except for not . This goal invokes a consistency derivation starting from (f g; H 0 ), where the goal set f g is eventually reduced to .
When the goal set f g is expanded, every possible derivation of is considered by CO1 and CO2, and since f g is reduced to , every such possible derivation is removed by applying CO1, CO4 (possibly following some applications of CO3), or CO5. By the de nition of H m , from the fact that not 2 H m we know P H`d . Note that it is not possible that P` , as otherwise by the completeness of linear reduction the empty goal 2 would have resulted, contradicting the fact that the goal set is reduced to . Thus, there exists at least one goal in the goal set of this consistency derivation that relies on abducibles in H. By the goal form assumption, we write it as : 1 ; :::; : k where not i 2 H for all 1 i k, and the sign : could also be not for any of the literals in the goal.
The defeat of this goal is subsequently proved by an abductive block starting with the goal ( i ; H 00 ), for some 1 i k and some H 00 such that H 0 H 00 H. There are two possibilities: not i 2 H m or not i 6 2 H m . In the rst case, since not i 2 H m and thus not i 2 H 0 , by the de nition of CO3 and CO4 of consistency derivation, no abductive refutation for i may be generated. The latter case is also not possible since the existence of an abductive refutation for i implies P H`d i (see part (1)), and then from the fact that not i 2 H we have not i 2 H m .
We thus conclude that the goal set f g cannot be reduced to , and consequently the assumed abductive refutation in the theorem cannot be generated.
Therefore, H must be ?-consistent.
PROOF of (3). For any not ' 2 H we show that it is acceptable w.r.t. H. This requires a proof that any assumption set N that attacks not ' (i.e. P N`d ') is defeated by H (i.e. P H`d for some not 2 N).
Note that not ' must appear in a goal of an abductive block and be proved by a consistency block starting with the goal set f 'g, along with a subset of H. By the goal form assumption, for each selected subgoal, CO1 and CO2 are always applied before CO3 and CO4. We observe the following facts: Linear resolution is sound and complete w.r.t.`, and thus no possibility of deriving ' under`is missed. In particular, any goal terminated by CO1 (an empty set of resolvents) or removed by CO5 (a positive loop) cannot contribute to an assumption set N such that P N`d '. CO2 does not remove, from the goal set, the goal upon which resolution is carried out.
A negated atom in a goal can only be generated initially by goal resolution, possibly followed by some steps of body literal resolution. From these facts we conclude that for any N such that P N`d ', CO1 and CO2 (augmented by CO5) could eventually generate an S N such that P S`d '. (Not all such S may be actually generated by DEKP; they continue to be generated by considering each subgoal as the selected literal until the defeat of N is shown.) Each of such S consists of the abducibles and negated atoms in a derived goal in which ordinary atoms are already resolved. In addition, each of these assumption set S must be non-empty, as otherwise 2 is in the goal set of this consistency derivation, contradicting the assumption that the given sequence ( ; ); :::; (2; H) is an abductive refutation.
The proof of the defeat for each of such S is as follows. Since S is nonempty, at some point in the given proof CO4 must be applied, possibly after some applications of CO3. For each such S, by eventually applying CO4, there is an abducible not 2 S (hence not 2 N) for which there is an abductive block from the goal . In this abductive block, if only AD1 is invoked, we have P` , and therefore P H`d . If AD2 is invoked, the abducible or negated atom in question is already in the current subset of H. If an abducible or negated atom is proved by applying AD3, it is also added to H. Thus in all cases, the abducibles needed to derive are all in H. Therefore, P H`d .
This shows that for each N such that P N`d ' there is not 2 N such that P H`d . Therefore, each not ' in H is acceptable w.r.t. H.
(Completeness) Suppose E is a nite regular extension and P E`d . We show there is an abductive refutation ( ; ); :::; (2; H) such that H E.
Since P E`d and AD1 is complete for`, we will not miss the derivation from the goal either to an empty goal, for which case the completeness holds trivially, or to a goal not ' 1 ; :::; not ' n (where each not ' i could be :' i ) such that fnot ' 1 ; :::; not ' n g E and P fnot ' 1 ; :::; not ' n g`d . Since these abducibles can be proved one at a time, it su ces to show the following claim: for any not ' 2 E, and any H 0 E there is an abductive refutation ( not '; H 0 ); :::; (2; H) such that H E.
The idea in the rest of the proof is as follows: since not ' belongs to a regular extension E, any attack to not ' is counter-attacked by E. The existence of the above abductive refutation is guaranteed by this attack and counter-attack relationship.
If not ' 2 H 0 , the conclusion holds trivially. Otherwise, the goal ( not '; H 0 ) invokes a consistency derivation that begins with (f 'g; H 0 fnot 'g). Each goal generated by CO1 or CO2 could lead to an assumption set S such that P S`d '.
CO5 removes any goal that cannot possibly be proved due to a positive loop. CO1 removes any goal containing at least one ordinary atom which cannot be resolved by any clause or previous goal. Clearly, these kind of goals cannot contribute to an S such that P S`d '. When it comes to a negated atom, CO2 guarantees that only new goals be added to the goal set (this also breaks a loop over a negated atom). From this, along with the fact that P is ground and nite, we establish that the set of goals generated in this consistency derivation is nite. Each goal not removed by CO1 or CO5 contributes to an assumption set S such that P S`d '. Note again that such an S is non-empty as otherwise P`d ', contradicting the assumption that not ' 2 E where E is a regular extension. By applying CO3 and/or CO4, each abducible in S will be chosen in turn to determine whether it is such an abducible not that P E`d . By the assumption that E is a regular extension and not ' 2 E, we know that for any S such that P S`d ' there is some not 2 S such that P E`d .
Therefore, an abductive derivation exists. That is, there is an E 0 E such that P E 0`d . Since AD1 is complete for`, a derived goal that consists of the abducibles (each of which could be the corresponding negated atom) of E 0 will not be missed. Now due to AD2, we only need to consider new abducibles in E 0 , calling it E 0 new = E ? (H 0 fnot 'g). That is E 0 new E (at least not ' is already assumed in the derivation). Then the same consistency-abductive process applies, and since E is nite, this process eventually terminates. 2 
Related Work and Remarks
Inoue and Sakama have also related (extended) disjunctive logic programming with abduction. In 19], they show how abductive programs (in the sense of 22]) can be transformed to extended disjunctive programs based on answer sets, and in 34], they showed how in general, an abductive program can be viewed as a disjunctive program with constraints. Our goal is somewhat di erent from theirs. We are interested in an abductive approach to disjunctive logic programming by interpreting default negations as abducibles in the sense of Eshghi and Kowalski. For this purpose, our focus is on a semantics that reduces to the regular model semantics for normal programs. It is known that the regular model semantics includes some ideas di erent from the notion of generalized stable models as de ned in 22]. It would be interesting to investigate a sound and complete proof procedure for generalized stable models with disjunction.
Aravindan is also interested in the problem of interpreting disjunctive programs as abductive programs 1]. But so far, only positive disjunctive programs have been related to abduction. A key in the formulation of the regular extension semantics is a \right" underlying logic, the standard rst-order derivation relation enhanced by the Rule of Assumption Commitment.
Minker and his colleagues at University of Maryland, College Park, has proposed a number of semantics for disjunctive programs (see 25] for a review of the eld including these semantics). These semantics generally involve some ideas di erent from those in the regular semantics, even for the case of normal programs. Thus these semantics are generally quite di erent from the regular extension semantics.
We remark that general frameworks like the one proposed in 23] often do not help much in guiding one into nding a solution when it comes to de ne a speci c system. One problem is that showing only that all the well-known semantics are xpoints of an operator is not enough. For example, we have shown that the maximal normal alternating xpoints of the operator F 2 P give us an abductive semantics, the regular extension semantics. These xpoints are also the xpoints of the acceptability operator as given in 23]. Although these maximal xpoints provide a suitable credulous semantics, it can be shown that the least xpoint of the same acceptability operator under the derivation relation`d yields a rather strange skeptical semantics, even for positive disjunctive programs. This is because the notion true in all minimal models cannot be captured by the least xpoint under this approach.
